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TRADE DRESS PROTECTION AND THE CONFUSION WITH 
DESIGN PATENTS 
PART ONE: TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
Roy J. Girasa * 
Richard J. Kraus** 
A company's sign or symbol certainly constitutes an 
important business asset. The public recognizes the 
McDonald's Arch, the Mercedes emblem, the unique "K" on 
Kellogg's products, and innumerable other signs or symbols. 
These trademarks convince many to purchase the products 
offered. Marketers also understand that the packaging and 
design of a product significantly influence a buyer to select a 
particular item. One need only examine the beautiful designs of 
perfume bottles or the blue Tiffany box packaging1 to visualize 
the time and effort expended to influence the purchase of such 
products. The law protects the packaging and design of 
products, but the nature and extent of such protection have led 
to some confusion among practitioners and scholars. A 
company may need to decide whether to seek protection in the 
form of common law trade dress under trademark law or 
attempt to obtain a design patent. These alternative modes offer 
*Professor of Law, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 
New York. 
**Professor of Law and Chairperson of Department of Legal 
Studies and Taxation, Lubin School of Business, Pace 
University, New York. 
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different levels of protection. This paper explores the confusion 
caused by the discrete levels of protection. It clarifies the 
nature and extent of legal protections offered by trademark law 
and patent law to trade dress and design patents. 
This article is divided into two parts: Part One will 
discuss trade dress protection at length including statutory and 
case protection. Part Two will detail the protection offered by a 
design patent together with a comparison of the two forms of 
protection. 
TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 
Trade Dress 
Automobile companies expend a great deal of money 
and effort to design their products so that the public will 
admire and purchase them. Furniture companies desire to 
market the unique designs of their furniture products. Many 
companies add ornamental features to their products to attract 
potential customers. What form of legal protection will assist 
companies to guard their distinctive features: trade dress or 
design patent protection? 
Trademark law protects trade dress. A trademark is a 
unique sign or symbol representing a product, service or 
organization.2 Such representation may be in the form of 
features that distinguish a manufacturer's goods or services 
from those of a competitor. The sign or symbol is used to 
identify the organization engaging in commerce. The purpose 
of trademark law is to protect a person or organization in its 
use of a symbol to represent it. The Mercedes symbol and the 
unique configuration of letters used by McDonald's restaurants 
or Kellogg's cereals convey to most persons a statement of 
quality, taste, or other special attribute. The law which protects 
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the use of these symbols also protects consumers. The law 
prevents copycats from discounting look-a-like products of 
inferior quality with the same or confusingly similar sign or 
symbol. Many companies spend a great deal of money and 
effort to create excellent products or perform services 
symbolized by a logo. Without legal protection, any other 
person can bypass such efforts and expenditures by using the 
logo to mislead purchasers who believe they have purchased 
the products or services from the original entity. The Federal 
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, as amended, protects 
consumers from any ensuing confusion or deception. The Act 
provides: 
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of 
the registrant -
(A) use in commerce any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 
registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of 
any goods or services on or in collllection with 
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive; ... shall be liable 
in a civil action by the registrant for the 
remedies hereinafter provided. 3 
The term Trade dress describes the distinctive, visual, 
non-functional, ornamental appearance of a product or 
packaging which may be afforded legal protection under 
trademark law.4 It is the overall or total image that may include 
the color, shape, graphic design, sound, configuration, or a 
particular scent. The appearance of the product or business 
must either be inherently distinctive or, like trademarks, have 
acquired "secondary meaning especially in the case of product 
design."5 Examples of trade dress include the facade of a 
building, the shape of a Coca-Cola bottle, the round wall-
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thermostat of Honeywell, the packaging for Wonder Bread, 
Campbell's soup label, the tray design for Healthy Choice 
frozen dinners, and numerous other designs. Trade dress 
protection does not extend to functionality of a product or 
packaging which may attain protection under patent law. 
Functionality refers to the cost, quality, or the ability of a 
manufacturer to compete in a manner that is nonreputational.6 
Like other trademarks, it has an indefinite time span of 
protection. 
Design Patent 
A patent is an invention or process that is novel, useful, 
and nonobvious. The Patent Act sets forth three types of 
patents that are afforded protection: (1) utility patents; (2) 
design patents; and (3) plant patents. A utility patent protects 
the way an invention or process is used and works. A design 
patent protects the way an article looks.7 A design patent is a 
patent granted to the holder of a design that "consists of visual 
ornamental characteristics embodied in, or applied to, an article 
of manufacture."8 A utility patent has a 20-year protection and 
exclusivity while a design patent is valid for 14 years. The 
design patent differs from trade dress in that a trade dress is 
non-functional while a design patent pertains to the ornamental 
design of a functional item. If the article lacks ornamentality it 
may not be registered as a design patent. 9 An invention may be 
granted both a utility and a design patent if the article possesses 
both features. A design patent differs from a copyright in that 
the former protects the ornamental aspect of the nonfunctional 
design while a copyright protects the copying of the 
nonfunctional original expression of an idea. The ornamental 
design may be on a portion or on the entire article or applied to 
the article. Each design patent application must consist of a 
single claim. 10 A plant patent, finally, protects newly invented 
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varieties of plants, not found in nature but produced by the 
inventor. 11 
STATUTORY AND CASE PROTECTION 
Trade Dress 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Trademark Protection 
Law of 1946, grants protection to even unregistered trade 
dress. 12 The statute, designed to protect inventors from "[f]alse 
designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution," creates 
a civil cause of action: 
(a) Civil action 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection 
with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or 
false or misleading representation of 
fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, 
or association of such 
person with another person, 
or as to the ongm, 
sponsorship, or approval of 
his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by 
another person, or 
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(B) in commercial advertising 
or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or 
her or another person's 
goods, services, or 
commercial activities. 
The basis for protection of a trademark, then, is to 
prevent confusion in the minds of the public as the origin, 
affiliation, and other aspects of a product or service. It also 
functions as the federal equivalent of unfair competition for 
unregistered goods. 13 Hansen Beverage Co. v. National 
Beverage Corp. 14 provides an example of a federal court' s 
refusal to grant protection due to consumer confusion. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court grant of 
injunction against the defendant because it was not likely that 
the plaintiff would succeed in its trade dress claim. In Hansen, 
the plaintiff produced and sold Monster Energy drinks. The 
beverage cans marketed by the plaintiff bore on the containers' 
surfaces a large clawed-out "M" and the word "MONSTER" 
on a dark background, with a different bold accent color for 
each of the four varieties of drinks sold. The defendant 
National Beverage thereafter also manufactured energy drinks 
using the word "FREEK" with a frightening evil-eyed 
creature's face on a dark background for its four comparable 
drinks. 
The Appeals Court stated that it was necessary for the 
plaintiff to establish that its trade dress was protectable in that 
it was nonfunctional and distinctive and to establish that the 
accused product's trade dress creates a likelihood of consumer 
confusion.15 The Court determined there was insufficient proof 
of a likelihood of confusion; it was, therefore, an abuse of 
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discretion for the District Court to grant an injunction. The two 
trade dresses were similar in their overall appearance. They 
used aggressive graphics and accent colors against dark 
backgrounds. Nevertheless, there was little likelihood of 
confusion as to the source of the products, especially because 
similar elements are found in the crowded energy drink 
market. 16 The Court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that 
"FREEK MAN" is the picture-equivalent of the word 
"MONSTER." The doctrine of word-picture equivalency 
applies only when "the word mark and its pictorial 
representation are concrete and narrow." 17 
Proof of Likelihood of Confusion: 
Most courts have adopted the eight factors cited in 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp.18 to determine if the 
public is likely to confuse the origin of a particular article 
based on its packaging. ( 1) The strength of the mark; (2) the 
degree of similarity; (3) the proximity of products; ( 4) bridging 
the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) junior user's bad 
faith; (7) the quality of the defendant's product; and (8) the 
sophistication of the consumer will assist the court ascertaining 
whether a likelihood of confusion exists. In individual cases, 
not all factors need be proven and some factors may be given 
greater weight than other factors .19 
Requirement of Secondary Meaninl0: 
United States Supreme Court cases have examined the 
necessity under §43(a) of the Lanham Act to establish a 
distinctive unregistered product design's secondary meaning. 
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases appear to provide contradictory 
determinations of the issue. 
2009/Trade Dress Protection/8 
In the oft-cited 1992 case of Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 21 the Court addressed the question "whether the 
trade dress of a restaurant may be protected under §43(a) of the 
Trademark Act of 1946 . . . based on a finding of inherent 
distinctiveness without proof that the trade dress has secondary 
meaning. "22 Taco Cabana owned and operated six restaurants 
in San Antonio, Texas. The restaurants created a vividly 
colorful atmosphere with paintings, artifacts, and murals on the 
interior and vibrant paint, bright awnings, and umbrellas on the 
exterior of the premises. Two Pesos, Inc. thereafter opened a 
restaurant in Houston, Texas. Its interior and exterior motifs 
were similar to that of Taco Cabana. Taco Cabana then sued 
Two Pesos for trade dress infringement; the District Court and 
Court of Appeals decided that infringement had occurred; an 
injunction was issued and damages were awarded. 
The United States Supreme Court, seeking to resolve a 
conflict among courts of appeals, confronted the issue of 
whether inherently distinctive trade dress was protected under 
§43(a) without a showing that it acquired secondary meaning.23 
The Court, citing the Third Restatement of Unfair 
Competition,24 enunciated the general rule concerning 
distinctiveness: "An identifying mark is distinctive and capable 
of being protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) 
had acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning. "25 
The purchasing public identifies or associates its design with a 
single producer or source rather than with the product itself. 26 
The plaintiff need only show that a substantial segment of the 
relevant consumer group makes the connection of the design to 
the particular manufacturer.27 The Court noted that §43(a) 
additionally requires nonfunctionality and proof of the 
likelihood of confusion. The Court continued that requiring 
proof of secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade 
dress would undermine the purposes of the Lanham Act. The 
protection of trade dress, like that of trademarks, serves to 
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protect their owners. This protection fosters competition and 
maintains the quality of products having a good reputation. 
Secondary meaning is not always necessary.28 The Court 
reasoned: 
Adding a secondary meaning requirement could 
have anticompetitive effects, creating particular 
burdens on the startup of small companies. It 
would present special difficulties for a 
business .. . that seeks to start a new product in a 
area and then expand into new markets. 
[It] would allow a competitor, which has not 
adopted a distinctive trade dress of its own, to 
appropriate the originator's dress in other 
markets and to deter the originator from 
expanding into and competing in these areas. 29 
In a number of cases that followed Two Pesos, the 
lower courts utilized the dual trade dress factors of inherently 
distinctiveness or the acquisition of distinctiveness through 
secondary meaning in determining whether to permit 
injunctions. Decisions that denied injunctions included 
Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc. 30 and L. & J G. Stickley, 
Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., Jnc.31 
Trade dress, then, may be viewed as supplementing 
both copyright law and patent law. It permits the protection of 
unpatentable product configurations and new marketing 
techniques. Nevertheless, courts have indicated that trade dress 
protection should not be overextended so as to undermine other 
intellectual property restrictions designed to prevent the 
monopolization of ideas and products. Trade dress does not 
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protect ideas, concepts, or a generalized type of appearance but 
1 h . . 32 on y t etr concrete expressiOn. 
The Wal-Mart Conundrum: 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc./3 however, 
substantially narrowed Two Pesos to its facts. In a unanimous 
ruling, the Court held that "in an action for infringement of 
unregistered trade dress under §43(a) of the Lanham Act, a 
product's design is distinctive, and therefore :erotectable, only 
upon a showing of secondary meaning." 4 The decision 
distinguished the product-design trade dress in the Wal-Mart 
action and product-packaging trade dress in Two Pesos. 
Product packaging is inherently distinctive because consumers 
will attribute the packaging to its origin. But product design is 
distinctive only when it is established that the consumer has 
attributed a secondary meaning to the product design. 
Consumers look to the design as being more useful and 
appealing rather than looking to the source of that design. 35 
Samara Brothers, Inc. had designed and manufactured 
children's clothing. Its primary product consisted of a one-
piece seersucker outfit with hearts, flowers, fruits, and other 
such designs. JCPenney purchased the product for retail sale in 
its stores. Wal-Mart, in order to compete in that market, 
contracted with a supplier to manufacture a similar line of 
children's outfits using Samara's designs with only minor 
changes. A representative of JCPenney complained to Samara 
that Wal-Mart and other stores were carrying the outfits at a 
discounted rate. JCPenney believed Samara had sold the outfits 
to these other stores, but it then learned that Wal-Mart had 
sought to imitate the Samara designs. Samara then sued 
alleging copyright infringement, consumer fraud, unfair 
competition, and infringement of unregistered trade dress under 
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§43(a) of the Lanham Act. All of the parties except Wal-Mart 
settled with Samara. The District Court, affirmed by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, found in favor of the 
plaintiff, Samara, awarding $1.6 million in damages, costs, and 
fees.36 
The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's 
decision. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, 
distinguished the trade dress of a product from the product's 
packaging.37 The Court reasoned that trade dress protection 
should not be applied to a product's design; its prior Two Pesos 
decision concerned the decor of a restaurant, not the design of a 
product. A dress design, such as the decor of a restaurant, could 
be protected under §43(a) as being inherently distinctive 
without a showing of secondary meaning but a product-design 
trade dress does require secondary meaning. 38 The Court held 
that the Two Pesos restaurant decor was either product 
packaging or something similar to it, normally viewed by 
consumers to indicate origin. 39 The Court, then, refused to 
extend the concept to the product design that underlay the 
Samara litigation. The Court's opinion noted that many courts 
of appeals have expanded the definition of marks registrable to 
include as trade dress "a category that originally included only 
the packaging, or 'dressing,' but in recent years it has been 
expanded ... to encompass the design of a product."40 The 
definition of "trademark" under Lanham Act §45 "includes any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof 
used by a person ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods, 
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold 
by others and to indicate the source of the goods ... " Courts of 
appeals have assumed correctly that trade dress constitutes a 
"symbol" or "device." There was nothing within the Lanham 
Act to require a producer to establish the distinctiveness of its 
trade dress, but courts have imposed that requirement. Without 
such a requirement, trade dress would not meet the statutory 
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element of confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of the goods.41 
The Court noted that a mark's distinctiveness can be 
demonstrated in two ways: (1) the mark may be inherently 
distinctive if it intrinsically identifies a particular source, such 
as marks that are "arbitrary" (e.g., "Camel" cigarettes), 
"fanciful" (e.g., "Kodak" film), or "suggestive" (e.g., "Tide" 
laundry detergent);42 or (2) by acquiring distinctiveness 
through the development of a secondary meaning, so that the 
public identifies the mark as the source of the product rather 
than the product itself.43 The opinion cited the Qualitex case, 
discussed below, which states that color is not inherently 
distinctive and requires secondary meaning to be protected. 
Similarly, product design also requires proof of secondary 
meaning for trademark protection because it serves purposes 
other than source identification. Product design will always 
raise the question of inherent distinctiveness, but consumers 
should have the benefits of competition in their decisions to 
purchase the product for its utilitarian and esthetic purposes. 44 
The product-packaging, product-design distinction 
made by the Court in Wal-Mart may cause significant 
confusion among lower courts, attorneys and their clients. A 
particular product marketing device may be inherently 
distinctive or may require proof of secondary meaning. An 
observer can sympathize with the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. That court had held that the Lanham Act §43(a) 
required secondary meaning for protection of unregistered 
trademarks; but the Supreme Court, although it denied 
certiorari in that case, stated in Two Pesos that trade dress does 
not require secondary protection.45 As we have seen, the Wal-
Mart controversy was an appeal from the Second Circuit. The 
appeals court determined that the District Court properly 
permitted an injunction against Wal-Mart even though no 
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secondary meaning was shown.46 The Supreme Court even 
acknowledged that its Wal-Mart decision may cause courts to 
draw difficult lines between product-design and product-
packaging trade dress cases. Some marketing situations will 
appear at the margin. If there are ambiguous cases, however, 
the Court dictates that trial courts should err in favor of 
requiring secondary meaning.47 The Court named the classic 
glass Coca-Cola bottle as a marginal case. The bottle may 
constitute product packaging to consumers who drink and 
discard the bottle. But the bottle may also be product design to 
consumers who purchase the bottle as collectors and drink 
from it because it is more stylish than the Coca-Cola can.48 
The difficulty with the Wal-Mart analysis is that the 
imposition of the secondary meaning requirement places the 
creator of a dress design in an almost untenable position. 
Consumers would need a substantial amount of time to be able 
to link the design to the particular manufacturer, but such 
designs often become out-of-style by the time such linkage is 
established. Procuring a dress design patent as an alternative 
requires a substantial amount of time in such a rapid turnover 
industry. The patent requirements of omamentality and non-
obviousness may be difficult to establish and the linkage to a 
particular manufacturer may render protection extremely 
difficult to obtain.49 
The decision is likely to cause companies to consider 
protections other than reliance upon trade dress trademark 
protection. They may have to place emphasis on packaging 
rather than product design to avoid the Supreme Court's 
requirement of secondary meaning.50 Two Pesos apparently 
protects product packaging in the form of distinctive external 
appearance without proof of secondary meaning but Wal-Mart 
significantly narrows the decision so as to exclude product 
design trade dress. Product packaging by its use of words and 
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symbols identifies the source of the product, while product 
design seeks to make the product more appealing, rather than 
identifying the origin of the product. Proof of secondary 
meaning will be costly because such proof is generally 
established by consumer surveys, use for a length of time, type 
of advertising, number of customers and sales, advertising 
expenditures, and other similar proof. 51 
Patent law, as previously noted, seeks to protect 
inventions that are new, useful, and non-obvious. The U.S. 
Patent Act limits protection for 20 years, permitting 
competitors to use the innovation once the monopoly period 
has ended. Innovators should not be permitted to extend the 20-
year time fame by using trademark law. The Court cited a 
uniquely shaped patented light bulb as an example. The 
originator should not be allowed to later use the shape of a bulb 
to extend indefinitely the protection of the patented bulb by 
using trademark law. Competitors would thereby be precluded 
from using their legitimate efforts to produce equivalent 
bulbs.52 
CONCLUSION 
The unique design and packaging of a product is often 
the major aspect of successful marketing of a product. There 
are two major forms of protection that may be utilized to give 
protection to distinct ornamental features of a product. In this 
Part One of the article, we explored the protection given under 
trademark law which is premised on the prevention of 
confusion in the minds of the public who endeavor to purchase 
a particular product. In the next part, we will review protection 
under the Patent Act and make a comparison between the two 
forms of legal protection given to ornamental features of a 
product. 
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capable of as a trademark to serve as a representation or designation of 
source under §43(a) (at 786). 
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